Copper is a strategic asset. In a more divided world, it is a test of who can build, electrify, and scale industry on schedule.
Recent flashpoints have been a reminder of the old rule: when supply is concentrated, minerals become political. Venezuela’s oil shows how quickly commodities can become instruments of statecraft. Greenland has become a case study in how critical minerals can completely shift the global geopolitical landscape.
What is new is the bottleneck. The International Energy Agency notes that for 19 of 20 strategic minerals, China is the leading refiner, with an average market share of 70%. Diversifying supply is now a strategic necessity. But the number of jurisdictions that combine scale, delivery certainty, political stability, and workable investment conditions is limited. For buyers, diversification increasingly means choosing from a narrow pool of suppliers that can realistically meet all four tests.
This is where Namibia’s case matters. The country is not the largest copper producer in Africa. But, it does not need to be. In a world where supply chains are judged on stability and delivery, Namibia has an advantage that is now scarce: predictability. Its policy direction is clear, its institutions work, and its approach to local content and beneficiation is designed to align with investor interests rather than disrupt them. For buyers, that combination reduces risk.
There is also a practical reason to pay attention. Global demand for copper is accelerating as electrification spreads across power grids, renewables, electric vehicles and data centres. Yet supply remains slow to respond. New copper mines now take close to two decades from discovery to first production, as permitting, financing and construction timelines stretch ever longer. That pace made sense when demand grew gradually and capital was abundant. It looks misaligned with the speed of today’s energy transition.
In that context, Namibia’s advantage lies in its brownfield copper assets, where geology is proven and core infrastructure already exists. Restarting such sites can bring copper to market within two to five years, typically at 50 –70% lower capital cost than greenfield projects. Just as importantly, these restarts allow operators to modernise legacy operations, raise environmental standards and deliver supply faster from a stable jurisdiction, at a moment when buyers are prioritising reliability over volume.
At Consolidated Copper Corp, we are applying that logic in Namibia by bringing three brownfield copper sites back into production: Tschudi, Otjihase, and Matchless. Quantity matters, but so does provenance. Manufacturers and investors are under pressure to show that the metals behind clean technologies come from responsible sources. The 'clean' in clean energy increasingly applies to the supply chain as well as the end product.
Our work is now moving from technical preparation to execution. Tschudi is nearing completion of its pre-feasibility study, which will be complete by the end of 1Q26, at which point we will go to the market for third-party financing. Behind it sits Central Operations, with its Matchless and Otjihase mines expected to complete a pre-feasibility study in 2Q26. By mid-year, we expect to have bankable studies across the portfolio. 2026 is about funding and execution.
Why Namibia matters now is not only geology. It is credibility. International partners are signalling that Namibia can sit inside the energy transition supply chain, not just on the margins of it. In September 2025, the EU announced a €1.3bn Global Gateway package for Namibia, linked to clean energy, including green hydrogen, and support tied to developing critical raw materials and local processing. In January 2026, that matters because capital is tighter and buyers are more cautious.
The story of copper in 2026 will be written by the jurisdictions and projects that can deliver supply faster, with clearer standards, and fewer political surprises. Namibia is building that kind of offer. In a fragmented world, this is a competitive advantage.